“Therefore to the unbegotten Father, indeed, we ought to preserve His proper dignity, in confessing that no one is the cause of His being; but to the Son must be allotted His fitting honour, in assigning to Him, as we have said, a generation from the Father without beginning, and allotting adoration to Him, so as only piously and properly to use the words, “He was,” and “always,” and “before all worlds,” with respect to Him; by no means rejecting His Godhead, but ascribing to Him a similitude which exactly answers in every respect to the Image and Exemplar of the Father. But we must say that to the Father alone belongs the property of being unbegotten, for the Saviour Himself said, My Father is greater than I.”
-Alexander, Bishop of Alexandria
via Unapologetica: The Early Church, Trinitarianism, and the Subordination of the Son I.
kaloni arcidiacono
December 27, 2012 at 9:59 AM
Im struggling to wrap my mind around this, it sounds as though he is saying that there was a moment when the Son did not exist, until he came from the Father. I am a Trinitarian who believes that father, son, and holy spirit are all uncaused, eternal, and equal, though they may serve different functions. Any help would be appreciated.
Patrick T. McWilliams
December 27, 2012 at 10:59 AM
Hi Kaloni, thanks for commenting!
In the quote provided above, Alexander is actually emphasizing the eternal nature of the Son’s generation. First, he speaks of the Father’s being unbegotten and uncaused. Next, while the Son is generated by the Father, it is an eternal generation without beginning, not like human generation which has a beginning. Alexander affirms that the Son “was…always…before all worlds.” He fully participates in the Godhead, and as the “Image and Exemplar of the Father,” he is similar to him in every respect (except for the Son’s being eternally begotten, while the Father is unbegotten).
“I am a Trinitarian who believes that father, son, and holy spirit are all uncaused, eternal, and equal, though they may serve different functions.”
I believe the Trinity as such is uncaused, that is, there is nothing outside the Trinity that caused it. However, examining the individual persons within the Trinity, the Father alone is unbegotten, while the Son is eternally begotten and the Spirit eternally proceeds. Thus all three persons, collectively and individually, are eternal. Yet as the Athanasian Creed states, “…they are not three eternals, but one eternal,” emphasizing the one definition of deity which unites the three persons. With regard to that definition of deity, they are equal, although with respect to their persons, the Father is greater than the Son (and Spirit), as Alexander quotes Christ.
I hope that helped!
kaloni arcidiacono
December 27, 2012 at 3:24 PM
Thanks for the help Patrick… After reading your response and giving it some more thought, I think I got it… My struggle was in that I thought an action must occur in time, which would mean that Christ is not eternal and not God, but this is not true of God… This “action” of the Son being begotten or generated of the Father, is of eternity.
Please correct me if im wrong. Again, thanks for your help.
Patrick T. McWilliams
December 27, 2012 at 3:56 PM
That sounds good to me, Kaloni. You may be interested in this article as well, which explores God’s relationship to time and eternity: http://sovereignlogos.wordpress.com/2012/12/27/the-omnitemporality-of-god-by-joel-parkinson/
rgmann
December 27, 2012 at 4:18 PM
The “eternal generation” of the Son (without beginning in time) involves a communication of the divine essence from the Father to the Son (as the Nicene Creed says, “God of [ek] God.”), but not the generation of a new essence. Therefore, even though the Son’s divine essence flows from the person of the Father, it is not derived from “another” essence and is therefore a se (i.e., self-existent).
While some would argue that this is contradictory, we do not have a formal contradiction because the term “derive” is being used in two different senses. When we affirm that the Son is derivative, we are referring to the communication of the divine essence from the Father to the Son in the act of eternal generation. When we deny that the Son is derivative, we are affirming that the divine essence as possessed by the Son is not derivative from any other essence outside itself.
Nor is this understanding unique to the early church creeds. The well respected Reformed theologian, Francis Turretin, writes:
“Although the Son is from the Father, nevertheless he may be called God-of-himself (autotheos), not with respect to his person, but essence; not relatively as Son (for thus he is from the Father), but absolutely as God inasmuch as he has the divine essence existing from itself and not divided or produced from another essence (but not as having that essence from himself.)” (Francis Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, vol. I (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1992), p. 291)
Turretin goes on to point out that this generation is not to be understood as the divine essence generating “another” divine essence (for that would involve tritheism), but as the person of the Father generating the person of the Son in a manner that involves the communication of the “same” divine essence.
Hopefully that sheds more not less light on the matter…
Patrick T. McWilliams
December 27, 2012 at 5:15 PM
Roger, I am not necessarily disagreeing with you, but I am curious if you would agree with the following reworkings of your statements:
“The ‘eternal generation’ of the Son (without beginning in time) involves a communication of the divine essence from the Father to the Son (as the Nicene Creed says, ‘God of [ek] God.’), but not the generation of a new essence. Therefore, even though the Son’s divine essence flows from the person of the Father, it is not derived from “another” essence and is therefore a se (i.e., self-existent).”
Because the Father possesses all the attributes of deity, his Son, by virtue of an eternal generation, also possesses all the attributes of deity. The definition of deity is exactly the same for both Father and Son. All such attributes (goodness, omnipotence, etc.) are possessed by the Father, who is uncaused and of himself, and therefore themselves are uncaused and ‘a se’.
“When we affirm that the Son is derivative, we are referring to the communication of the divine essence from the Father to the Son in the act of eternal generation.”
I would explain the Son’s derivation as the generation of a person by a person. The Son, being the offspring of the Father, shares the same definition of deity just as I share the same definition of humanity as my father.
“When we deny that the Son is derivative, we are affirming that the divine essence as possessed by the Son is not derivative from any other essence outside itself.”
“The Son” refers to a person, who is generated/caused by/derived from the Father. The definition of deity (consisting of all the attributes thereof), which is included in the definition of the Son, is uncaused, since it is part of the definition of the Father.
I have found Gordon Clark’s definition of the term “essence” as “definition” to be most helpful as it sheds any tendency to think of “essence” in a materialistic sense.
rgmann
December 28, 2012 at 4:24 AM
Hi Patrick,
I don’t object to that rewording per se, but I’m not sure that it improves the idea being communicated very much. Rather, it seems as if we’re both conveying the same concept merely with different words.
I have found Gordon Clark’s definition of the term “essence” as “definition” to be most helpful as it sheds any tendency to think of “essence” in a materialistic sense.
I don’t, of course, see the term “essence” (ousia) as expressing any type of physical matter, for “there is but one only, living, and true God, who is infinite in being and perfection, a most pure spirit, invisible, without body, parts, or passions” (WCF 2.1). But what is an infinite “being” and “most pure spirit” if not some sort of immaterial substance? I fail to see how “definition” better describes an immaterial spirit than terms such as “essence,” “substance,” or “being.” I tend to agree with William Lane Craig that “God is a soul which is endowed with three complete sets of rational cognitive faculties, each sufficient for personhood.” Here’s how he explains it in more detail:
What makes the human soul a person is that the human soul is equipped with rational faculties of intellect and volition which enable it to be a self-reflective agent capable of self-determination. Now God is very much like an unembodied soul; indeed, as a mental substance God just seems to be a soul. We naturally equate a rational soul with a person, since the human souls with which we are acquainted are persons. But the reason human souls are individual persons is because each soul is equipped with one set of rational faculties sufficient for being a person. Suppose, then, that God is a soul which is endowed with three complete sets of rational cognitive faculties, each sufficient for personhood. Then God, though one soul, would not be one person but three, for God would have three centers of self-consciousness, intentionality, and volition, as Social Trinitarians maintain. God would clearly not be three discrete souls because the cognitive faculties in question are all faculties belonging to just one soul, one immaterial substance. God would therefore be one being which supports three persons, just as our individual beings each support one person. Such a model of Trinity Monotheism seems to give a clear sense to the classical formula “three persons in one substance.” (http://www.reasonablefaith.org/a-formulation-and-defense-of-the-doctrine-of-the-trinity#ixzz2GKUvFEvs)
I would recommend reading the entire article for a better grasp of this model of the Trinity. I tentatively agree with him (barring a better explanation), but I part ways with him in his rejection of the eternal generation of the Son and procession of the Spirit. As he puts it:
Finally, such a model does not feature (though it does not preclude) the derivation of one person from another, enshrined in the confession that the Son is “begotten of the Father before all worlds, Light of Light, very God of very God, begotten, not made” (Constantinopolitan Creed). God could simply exist eternally with His multiple cognitive faculties and capacities. This is, in my opinion, all for the better. For although credally affirmed, the doctrine of the generation of the Son (and the procession of the Spirit) is a relic of Logos Christology which finds virtually no warrant in the biblical text and introduces a subordinationism into the Godhead which anyone who affirms the full deity of Christ ought to find very troubling.
I don’t find these doctrines troubling in the least, for the reasons that I gave in my earlier post. Let me know what you think…
Patrick T. McWilliams
December 28, 2012 at 3:41 PM
If you haven’t read Gordon Clark’s book on the Trinity, I highly recommend it. In it he demonstrates the meaninglessness of the terms ‘substance’ and ‘being,’ while clearly defining and replacing the words ‘essence’ and ‘nature’ with ‘definition.’ I don’t know if Craig defines “soul” elsewhere, but as he seems to make it equivalent to “substance” and “being,” I wonder if it means anything at all. I, too, have no problem with the doctrines of eternal generation and procession, or with the Nicene Creed (although I am currently undecided regarding the filioque clause).
rgmann
December 28, 2012 at 4:05 PM
I have read Clark’s book on the Trinity, and found parts of it helpful and other parts not so much. I think he really veered off the right track with his book on the Incarnation though…
I believe that Craig defines soul as an “immaterial substance,” such as an angel or human ghost. The difference with the divine soul being that it does not exist in a localized form as an angel or human ghost does, for God is omnipresent and without form. Here’s the relevant portion of his article if you haven’t read it yet:
Perhaps we can get a start at this question by means of an analogy. (There is no reason to think that there must be any analogy to the Trinity among created things, but analogies may prove helpful as a springboard for philosophical reflection and formulation.) In Greco-Roman mythology there is said to stand guarding the gates of Hades a three-headed dog named Cerberus. We may suppose that Cerberus has three brains and therefore three distinct states of consciousness of whatever it is like to be a dog. Therefore, Cerberus, while a sentient being, does not have a unified consciousness. He has three consciousnesses. We could even assign proper names to each of them: Rover, Bowser, and Spike. These centers of consciousness are entirely discrete and might well come into conflict with one another. Still, in order for Cerberus to be biologically viable, not to mention in order to function effectively as a guard dog, there must be a considerable degree of cooperation among Rover, Bowser, and Spike. Despite the diversity of his mental states, Cerberus is clearly one dog. He is a single biological organism exemplifying a canine nature. Rover, Bowser, and Spike may be said to be canine, too, though they are not three dogs, but parts of the one dog Cerberus. If Hercules were attempting to enter Hades, and Spike snarled at him or bit his leg, he might well report, “Cerberus snarled at me” or “Cerberus attacked me.” Although the Church Fathers rejected analogies like Cerberus, once we give up divine simplicity Cerberus does seem to represent what Augustine called an image of the Trinity among creatures.
We can enhance the Cerberus story by investing him with rationality and self-consciousness. In that case Rover, Bowser, and Spike are plausibly personal agents and Cerberus a tri-personal being. Now if we were asked what makes Cerberus a single being despite his multiple minds, we should doubtless reply that it is because he has a single physical body. But suppose Cerberus were to be killed, and his minds survive the death of his body. In what sense would they still be one being? How would they differ intrinsically from three exactly similar minds which have always been unembodied? Since the divine persons are, prior to the Incarnation, three unembodied Minds, in virtue of what are they one being rather than three individual beings?
The question of what makes several parts constitute a single object rather than distinct objects is a difficult one. But in this case perhaps we can get some insight by reflecting on the nature of the soul. Souls are immaterial substances, and some substance dualists believe that animals have souls. Souls thus come in a spectrum of varying capacities and faculties. Higher animals such as chimpanzees and dolphins possess souls more richly endowed with powers than those of iguanas and turtles. What makes the human soul a person is that the human soul is equipped with rational faculties of intellect and volition which enable it to be a self-reflective agent capable of self-determination. Now God is very much like an unembodied soul; indeed, as a mental substance God just seems to be a soul. We naturally equate a rational soul with a person, since the human souls with which we are acquainted are persons. But the reason human souls are individual persons is because each soul is equipped with one set of rational faculties sufficient for being a person. Suppose, then, that God is a soul which is endowed with three complete sets of rational cognitive faculties, each sufficient for personhood. Then God, though one soul, would not be one person but three, for God would have three centers of self-consciousness, intentionality, and volition, as Social Trinitarians maintain. God would clearly not be three discrete souls because the cognitive faculties in question are all faculties belonging to just one soul, one immaterial substance. God would therefore be one being which supports three persons, just as our individual beings each support one person. Such a model of Trinity Monotheism seems to give a clear sense to the classical formula “three persons in one substance.”
rgmann
December 28, 2012 at 4:08 PM
By the way, I just thought of something regarding your statements that the Father and Son both possess “all the attributes of deity.” As Craig points out in his article, the one “essence” (ousia) of God bears the property or attribute of being triune. Yet the “persons” (hypostaseis) of the Trinity themselves do not exemplify that property. That is, the Father is not triune in his person; the Son is not triune in his person; and the Holy Spirit is not triune in his person. Thus, the Father, Son, and Spirit do not individually possess “all the attributes of deity.” Therefore there must be some sort of part/whole relation within the Godhead, as Craig argues. For example, God is an individual triune soul (the “whole”) which is endowed with three complete sets of rational cognitive faculties, each sufficient for personhood (the “part”). That seems coherent to me. What do you think?
Patrick T. McWilliams
December 28, 2012 at 4:22 PM
One of the best bits of The Trinity is the rejection of the meaningless term “substance.” Does Craig define it, or is it the same as Locke’s “something I know not what”?
I think Clark’s book on the Incarnation is excellent, although I wish the ending could have been completed.
The definition (essence) of deity does not include triunity. The definition of the Godhead (Trinity) does, tautologically.
Craig’s failure to distinguish between different senses of the word “God” (e.g. deity & the Godhead/Trinity) leads him to (unintentionally, I’m sure) posit that the Father is not fully divine, as he does not possess triunity in himself.
Triunity is a predicate attached to the subject “deity;” it is not part of the definition of deity, that is, what it means to be divine.
rgmann
December 28, 2012 at 5:11 PM
The distinction you’re trying to make doesn’t seem correct to me. I’m not sure how we can conceive of the divine nature itself as not bearing the property (and thus “definition”) of being Triune. Nor do I see how we can conceive of the divine persons themselves as not bearing that property.
Nevertheless, I’m assuming that you haven’t carefully read through Craig’s article yet. Because he doesn’t fail to “distinguish between different senses of the word ‘God’ (e.g. deity & the Godhead/Trinity)” as you seem to think. In fact, his model relies upon such a distinction. Craig writes:
Now if the Trinity is divine but is not a fourth instance of the divine nature, this suggests that there is more than one way to be divine. This alternative is said to lead to Plantingian Arianism. What is that? Leftow defines it as “the positing of more than one way to be divine.”5 This is uninformative, however; what we want to know is why the view is objectionable. Leftow responds, “If we take the Trinity’s claim to be God seriously, . . . we wind up downgrading the Persons’ deity and/or [being] unorthodox.”6 The alleged problem is that if only the Trinity exemplifies the complete divine nature, then the way in which the persons are divine is less than fully divine.
This inference would follow, however, only if there were but one way to be divine (namely, by exemplifying the divine nature); but the position asserts that there is more than one way to be divine. The persons of the Trinity are not divine in virtue of exemplifying the divine nature. For presumably being triune is a property of the divine nature (God does not just happen to be triune); yet the persons of the Trinity do not exemplify that property. It now becomes clear that the reason that the Trinity is not a fourth instance of the divine nature is that there are no other instances of the divine nature. The Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are not instances of the divine nature, and that is why there are not three Gods. The Trinity is the sole instance of the divine nature, and therefore there is but one God. So while the statement “The Trinity is God” is an identity statement, statements about the persons like “The Father is God” are not identity statements. Rather they perform other functions, such as ascribing a title or office to a person (like “Belshazzar is King,” which is not incompatible with there being co-regents) or ascribing a property to a person (a way of saying, “The Father is divine,” as one might say, “Belshazzar is regal”).
So if the persons of the Trinity are not divine in virtue of being instances of the divine nature, in virtue of what are they divine? Consider an analogy. One way of being feline is to exemplify the nature of a cat. But there are other ways to be feline as well. A cat’s DNA or skeleton is feline, even if neither is a cat. Nor is this a sort of downgraded or attenuated felinity: a cat’s skeleton is fully and unambiguously feline. Indeed, a cat just is a feline animal, as a cat’s skeleton is a feline skeleton. Now if a cat is feline in virtue of being an instance of the cat nature, in virtue of what is a cat’s DNA or skeleton feline? One plausible answer is that they are parts of a cat. This suggests that we could think of the persons of the Trinity as divine because they are parts of the Trinity, that is, parts of God. Now obviously, the persons are not parts of God in the sense in which a skeleton is part of a cat; but given that the Father, for example, is not the whole Godhead, it seems undeniable that there is some sort of part/whole relation obtaining between the persons of the Trinity and the entire Godhead.
Far from downgrading the divinity of the persons, such an account can be very illuminating of their contribution to the divine nature. For parts can possess properties which the whole does not, and the whole can have a property because some part has it. Thus, when we ascribe omniscience and omnipotence to God, we are not making the Trinity a fourth person or agent; rather God has these properties because the persons do. Divine attributes like omniscience, omnipotence, and goodness are grounded in the persons’ possessing these properties, while divine attributes like necessity, aseity, and eternity are not so grounded (and being Triune – rgmann). With respect to the latter, the persons have these properties because God as a whole has them. For parts can have some properties in virtue of the wholes of which they are parts. The point is that if we think of the divinity of the persons in terms of a part/whole relation to the Trinity that God is, then their deity seems in no way diminished because they are not instances of the divine nature (emphasis mine – rgmann).
I’ll have to sign off for now, because I have to run. I’ll try to respond to anything you write later tonight or tomorrow…
Patrick T. McWilliams
December 29, 2012 at 2:21 PM
Roger, you are correct; I have not read carefully through Craig’s article. Thank you for the correction regarding his distinction between different senses of divinity. Now that you have pointed that out, I can say I disagree with his construction.
I hold to the very generic unity Craig rejects. For me, to say “the divine essence is triune” simply means there are three (and only three) subjects who possess the definition of deity. Thus the Father is not triune, the Son is not triune, and the Spirit is not triune. The Godhead is triune. But if triunity were an attribute of deity (as in the list: goodness, omniscience, triunity, etc.), that would mean the Father is not deity because he is not triune. This model also does not lead to the Trinity as being a fourth instance of the divine nature.
Craig writes, “The persons of the Trinity are not divine in virtue of exemplifying the divine nature. For presumably being triune is a property of the divine nature (God does not just happen to be triune); yet the persons of the Trinity do not exemplify that property.”
I think Craig presumes incorrectly. I believe there is one definition of deity possessed by three individual persons who each possess that definition as part of their own unique definitions.
Craig posits that the definition of God includes the full definitions of Father, Son, and Spirit, leading to the odd view that God is both begotten and unbegotten, unincarnate and incarnate, etc.) Clark’s (and my) view is that the definition of deity does not encompass (but is rather included by) the definitions of each person. Thus (simplistically speaking) deity + unbegottenness = Father; deity + begottenness = Son; and deity + procession = Spirit.
Unlike Craig, my view affirms the full definition of deity to each person. Craig can only give each person a third of full divinity.
rgmann
December 30, 2012 at 4:06 AM
We’ll probably just have to agree to disagree here. But I honestly don’t think you’ve correctly understood Craig’s position, so let me briefly address a few of your remarks.
But if triunity were an attribute of deity (as in the list: goodness, omniscience, triunity, etc.), that would mean the Father is not deity because he is not triune.
As Craig explains, that would be true “only if there were but one way to be divine (namely, by exemplifying the divine nature); but the position asserts that there is more than one way to be divine. The persons of the Trinity are not divine in virtue of exemplifying the divine nature.” This seems correct to me, for if each person were a unique instance of the generic divine nature (i.e., exemplifying the divine nature), then we are logically left with thritheism rather than monotheism. Each person may be divine under such a model, but they are also three distinct Gods. It’s no different than three men each being a unique instance of the generic human nature (i.e., exemplifying the human nature) and thus being three distinct humans.
However, under Craig’s model “the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are not [unique] instances of the divine nature, and that is why there are not three Gods. The Trinity [as a whole] is the sole instance of the divine nature, and therefore there is but one God.” Thus, while the three persons fully share or participate in the one Triune nature (i.e., divine soul or immaterial substance), they are not individually identical with the one Triune nature. As Craig points out, “given that the Father, for example, is not the whole Godhead, it seems undeniable that there is some sort of part/whole relation obtaining between the persons of the Trinity and the entire Godhead.”
Unlike Craig, my view affirms the full definition of deity to each person. Craig can only give each person a third of full divinity.
That’s not correct. For example, Craig writes: “Far from downgrading the divinity of the persons, such an account can be very illuminating of their contribution to the divine nature… Divine attributes like omniscience, omnipotence, and goodness are grounded in the persons’ possessing these properties, while divine attributes like necessity, aseity, and eternity [and being triune] are not so grounded. With respect to the latter [i.e., necessity, aseity, eternity, and being triune], the persons have these properties because God as a whole has them. For parts can have some properties in virtue of the wholes of which they are parts.”
Thus, on Craig’s model, the persons of the Trinity are fully divine “in virtue of the whole of which they are parts.” This doesn’t mean they are “parts” of the whole in the sense that the divine nature has been divided up into thirds (as you seem to have incorrectly assumed). Rather, they fully participate in the one divine soul/nature, since they are three “complete sets of rational cognitive faculties” of the one divine soul/nature.
Craig posits that the definition of God includes the full definitions of Father, Son, and Spirit, leading to the odd view that God is both begotten and unbegotten, unincarnate and incarnate, etc.
No, you’re simply misunderstanding what he’s saying. Craig posits that the whole “Godhead” (i.e., the divine soul, essence, nature, or being) includes the full definition of Father, Son, and Spirit. But terms such as “begotten and unbegotten, unincarnate and incarnate” do not pertain to the whole “Godhead” itself. Rather, they only apply to the individual “persons” within the Godhead. The “Father” is unbegotten, while the “Son” is begotten; the “Son” is incarnate, while the “Father” is unincarnate, etc. But the Father, Son, and Spirit themselves do not include the full definition of the “Godhead” itself, since they don’t individually exemplify the property of being Triune.
Clark’s (and my) view is that the definition of deity does not encompass (but is rather included by) the definitions of each person. Thus (simplistically speaking) deity + unbegottenness = Father; deity + begottenness = Son; and deity + procession = Spirit.
This seems to confirm my earlier assessment that your view is tritheistic. If the complete definition of deity resides solely in each person, then we don’t have one “Triune” God, but rather three “individual” Gods who are not ontologically unified in any way. Thus the carefully formulated homoousion of the historic creeds is destroyed.
Patrick T. McWilliams
December 31, 2012 at 2:15 PM
“This seems correct to me, for if each person were a unique instance of the generic divine nature (i.e., exemplifying the divine nature), then we are logically left with thritheism rather than monotheism.”
This assumes your definition of monotheism, which I reject.
“Thus, on Craig’s model, the persons of the Trinity are fully divine “in virtue of the whole of which they are parts.””
This assumes Craig’s definition of “fully divine,” which I reject. I think it means each person possesses all the attributes of divinity. Craig thinks it means the persons are parts of God. In a sense, he’s right, but he’s wrong to say that none of the three persons possesses the entirety of the definition of deity.
“The “Father” is unbegotten, while the “Son” is begotten; the “Son” is incarnate, while the “Father” is unincarnate, etc. But the Father, Son, and Spirit themselves do not include the full definition of the “Godhead” itself, since they don’t individually exemplify the property of being Triune.”
Agreed, but is “Godhead” synonymous with “divine nature”? For you, yes; for me, no.
“This seems to confirm my earlier assessment that your view is tritheistic. If the complete definition of deity resides solely in each person, then we don’t have one “Triune” God, but rather three “individual” Gods who are not ontologically unified in any way. Thus the carefully formulated homoousion of the historic creeds is destroyed.”
I disagree, because I prefer Augustine’s realism over Craig, a molinist who rejects the timelessness of God.
rgmann
January 2, 2013 at 11:01 AM
“This seems correct to me, for if each person were a unique instance of the generic divine nature (i.e., exemplifying the divine nature), then we are logically left with thritheism rather than monotheism.”
This assumes your definition of monotheism, which I reject.
My definition of monotheism is that there’s only one ontologically distinct divine being, nature, or essence – the triune God of Scripture. What other orthodox definition is there?
However, if you reject that definition, then you’ll have to explain how your view constitutes monotheism rather than tritheism – i.e., three ontologically distinct divine beings or gods. For when three distinct persons each exemplify “all the attributes of humanity,” they without a doubt constitute three ontologically distinct human beings or men. So how can three distinct persons who each exemplify “all the attributes of deity” not constitute three ontologically distinct divine beings or gods? They can’t, plain and simple. There can only be one instance or exemplification of the complete divine nature (“the entirety of the definition of deity”) in monotheism. If there are three instances or exemplifications of the complete divine nature, then we have tritheism.
“Thus, on Craig’s model, the persons of the Trinity are fully divine “in virtue of the whole of which they are parts.”
This assumes Craig’s definition of “fully divine,” which I reject. I think it means each person possesses all the attributes of divinity. Craig thinks it means the persons are parts of God. In a sense, he’s right, but he’s wrong to say that none of the three persons possesses the entirety of the definition of deity.
If each person “possesses all the attributes of divinity,” then you’ll have to explain how they do not constitute three ontologically distinct gods, and how you can still claim to worship the one “triune” God of Scripture. Why? Because being “triune” is an essential property or attribute of God’s one nature (homoousia). Only the divine nature itself can be tripersonal; the person’s themselves are unipersonal. Thus being triune is part of the “definition” of what it means to be God – i.e., “the entirety of the definition of deity.”
“The “Father” is unbegotten, while the “Son” is begotten; the “Son” is incarnate, while the “Father” is unincarnate, etc. But the Father, Son, and Spirit themselves do not include the full definition of the “Godhead” itself, since they don’t individually exemplify the property of being Triune.”
Agreed, but is “Godhead” synonymous with “divine nature”? For you, yes; for me, no.
Again, then how do you still have monotheism? If the divine nature itself (“the entirety of the definition of deity”) doesn’t include the property or attribute of being tripersonal, then in what sense do you have one triune God? Conversely, if the persons of the Godhead each individually exemplify the complete divine nature (as you maintain), then how do you not have three gods that you worship?
“This seems to confirm my earlier assessment that your view is tritheistic. If the complete definition of deity resides solely in each person, then we don’t have one “Triune” God, but rather three “individual” Gods who are not ontologically unified in any way. Thus the carefully formulated homoousion of the historic creeds is destroyed.”
I disagree, because I prefer Augustine’s realism over Craig, a molinist who rejects the timelessness of God.
I reject Craig’s Molinism too. I don’t believe there’s any such thing as middle knowledge or libertarian free will. I couldn’t disagree with him more on those points. However, to the best of my knowledge Molinism doesn’t necessarily reject the timelessness of God (“Molinism holds that God’s knowledge consists of three logical moments. These “moments” of knowledge are not to be thought of as chronological; rather they are to be understood as “logical.” In other words, one moment does not come before another moment in time, rather one moment is logically prior to the other moments.” http://www.theopedia.com/Molinism). But what does that have to do with the price of tea in China? Whether one is a realist or not, it necessarily follows that if the complete definition of deity resides solely in each person, then we no longer have one triune or tripersonal God, but rather three individual gods who are not ontologically unified in any way.
In closing, I just want to reemphasize that Craig’s model doesn’t diminish the deity of the persons of the Trinity in any way, as you alleged earlier. As I mentioned before, the persons of the Trinity are fully divine “in virtue of the whole of which they are parts.” They each fully share or participate in the divine nature. Indeed, it is the Father who communicates the divine essence to the Son by eternal generation and to the Holy Spirit through eternal spiration. But the important thing this view does in fact do is preclude the notion that each person is a unique instance of “the entirety of the definition of deity,” thus making three individual gods. As I’ve said before, there can only be one instance or exemplification of the complete divine nature in monotheism. If there are three instances or exemplifications of the complete divine nature, then we have tritheism.
Patrick T. McWilliams
January 2, 2013 at 12:51 PM
Not really much more I can say about why my view is monotheistic. Honestly I think it’s probably more of a semantic thing, with you and Craig positing a “one Trinity.” That is, the persons are three, but together (and only together) are they one God. Whereas I of course acknowledge that there is one God who is three persons, but my emphasis is on the generic unity – all three are fully divine. I still prefer my terminology over calling triunity an attribute of deity rather than a predicate of the Godhead as such.
“God is timeless without creation and temporal subsequent to creation.” – Craig
Read more: http://www.reasonablefaith.org/god-time-and-eternity#ixzz2Gq1JDV5a
rgmann
January 2, 2013 at 1:42 PM
Okay, we’ll leave it at that then. Thank you for the stimulating debate!
I haven’t read that article by Craig yet, so I’ll check it out as soon as I get the chance. Is his view similar to Robert L Reymond’s, as articulated in his Systematic Theology? If so, I’ll most likely disagree with it. In fact, I read Joel Parkinson’s article that you posted a while back, and it seemed right on the money to me. But I’m always open to new arguments… Take care and peace.
Patrick T. McWilliams
January 2, 2013 at 1:49 PM
Disclaimer: I haven’t read that whole transcript either, actually. Not sure how Craig compares to Reymond, but I think Parkinson is right on the money as well. Thanks for reading/commenting!
Reasonable Christian
March 23, 2013 at 7:55 AM
Craig’s assertion that God changes into a temporal being after creation is a violation of the logic of immutability as a proposition of deity. Malachi 3:6; James 1:17