Berkhof on Theological Interpretation

Louis Berkhof

After spending a chapter each on the Grammatical and Historical Interpretation of Scripture, Louis Berkhof, in his Principles of Biblical Interpretation, begins his chapter on what he calls the “Theological Interpretation.” Berkhof claims that the strict grammatico-historical method of interpreting Scripture fails to take into account the unique God-breathed character of the Bible. He writes,

 Many writers on Hermeneutics are of the opinion that the grammatical and historical interpretation meet all the requirements for the proper interpretation of the Bible. They have no eye for the special theological character of this discipline. There are others, however, who are conscious of the necessity of recognizing a third element in the interpretation of Scripture.

…

Scripture contains a great deal that does not find its explanation in history, nor in the secondary authors, but only in God as the Auctor primarius.Purely historical and psychological considerations will not account for the following facts: (1) that the Bible is the Word of God; (2) that it constitutes an organic whole, of which each individual book is an integral part; (3) that the Old and New Testament [sic] are related to each other as type and antitype, prophecy and fulfillment, germ and perfect development; and (4) that not only the explicit statements of the Bible, but also what may be deduced from it by good and necessary consequence, constitutes the Word of God. In view of all this, it is not only perfectly warranted, but absolutely necessary, to complement the usual grammatical and historical interpretation with a third.

The name “Theological Interpretation” deserves the preference, as expressive, at once, of the fact that its necessity follows from the divine authorship of the Bible, and of the equally important consideration that, in the last analysis, God is the proper Interpreter of His Word (pp.133-134).

Readers familiar with the Scripturalism of Gordon H. Clark may find that the portions I have emphasized in bold font have a familiar ring to them. Berkhof is writing about Hermeneutics, not Apologetics, but his attitude is clearly presuppositional in nature. It must be assumed that the Bible (alone) is the Word of God – the Christian Axiom. This is of paramount importance for the proper interpretation of Scripture. If one does not, at the beginning, axiomatically approach the Bible as God’s Word, no amount of historical or coincidental external evidence will prove it to be so.

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What are Good Works?

Here are some helpful comments from Gordon H. Clark which answer the question of how one can know good works from evil ones. Emphasis in bold is my own.

What then are good works? Are they those actions a benevolently intentioned gentleman may happen to enjoy? Is a substantial donation to an orphanage, hospital, or church a good work? Strange as it may seem to non-Christians, and even to uninstructed Christians, the answer is that these actions are not necessarily good. They may be good; but again they may not be. What then makes a work or action good?

Two requirements must be fulfilled before an act can properly be called good. The [Westminster] Confession says, “Good works are only such as God hath commanded in his holy word, and not such as, without the warrant thereof, are devised by men out of blind zeal, or upon any pretense of good intention.”

The first part of this section teaches that unless we had the Bible, it would be impossible to know what is good and what is evil. To be sure, the heathen know that there is a distinction between right and wrong; and they regularly violate their consciences; but they do not know in particular what acts are right because their consciences are unenlightened. The Biblical revelation is essential to a knowledge of what works are good (“Good Works,” Essays on Ethics and Politics, p. 104; originally published in The Southern Presbyterian Journal, February 9, 1955.).

Gordon H. Clark on Naturalistic Ethics

“Unfortunately for naturalism all such attempts [to base ethics on empiricism, social demands, individual goods, and all without benefit of revelation] are failures because there is no empirical knowledge sufficient to brand murder as wrong and private property as right. Any empirical calculation to foster the good life in all persons affected by one’s conduct is a vain dream. Even if it were true that murder and theft frequently result in pain to the perpetrator, it is clear that this is not universally true. Hitler may have suffered for his murders and confiscations; but Stalin lived to a ripe old age, enjoying the almost perfect fruition of his vengeful plans. Few adherents of Biblical morality can boast of such empirical success. Indeed, even in the case of Hitler, his final catastrophe included, what purely naturalistic argumen could show that his life was not better than the lives of the six million Jews he murdered? He enjoyed excitement, wealth, and power for several years, and suffered only a few moments. Is not this a better life than that of his pitiful victims? Unless there is an Almighty God to impose inescapable penalties on transgressors, why should we not praise the rich, full, stimulating, dangerous life of a dictator?

Any theory therefore which denies divine sanctions for violation of divine law not only fails to condemn murder, adultery, and theft, but in addition fails to establish any universal or common distintion between right and wrong. Naturalism therefore cannot serve as a ground for Christian morals, nor can it serve as a ground even for the inculcation of the personal preferences of its exponents. In an empirical, descriptive philosophy, one may find the verb is; but the verb ought has no logical standing.”

From an essay entitled “Can Moral Education be Grounded in Naturalism?” in Clark’s Essays on Ethics and Politics, Jefferson: Trinity Foundation, 1992. pp. 9-10. Essay originally published in the Bulletin of the Evangelical Theological Society, Fall 1958.